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ABSTRACT 
Using data from 20 OECD countries, we find that firms with greater organization capital have 
significantly higher stock returns and that this represents an international phenomenon. We also 
find new evidence that the positive association between organization capital and stock returns 
increases with labor market flexibility. This finding is consistent with greater labor mobility and 
competition in flexible labor markets rendering organization capital investment riskier from the 
shareholders’ perspective.  
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1. Introduction 
The economics and finance literature has documented that labor market regulations play an 
important role in determining employee turnover, productivity growth, and a number of 
corporate decisions, such as capital structure and cash holdings (see, e.g., Besley and Burgess, 
2004; Autor, Kerr, and Kugler, 2007; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 
2015; and Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos, 2017). Since labor institutions differ considerably 
across countries, a natural and yet unexplored question is whether labor-related investments 
could have different risk and return implications for shareholders. A deeper understanding of the 
effects of such investments is important for both investors (in making portfolio decisions) and 
managers (in allocating firm resources). In this paper, light is shed on this issue by investigating 
the pricing of organization capital risk across different labor markets.  
 Organization capital consists of the expertise or knowledge embodied in a firm’s key 
employees that contributes to productivity (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). 1  Although 
organization capital investment is a source of growth (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev, 
Radhakrishnan, and Zhang, 2009), it is risky for shareholders. According to Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), since part of organization capital is embodied in key talent and thus 
potentially movable across firms, key talent can extract payment from shareholders equal to their 
outside option. When outside option improves, the higher compensation required to retain key 
talent reduces the fraction of cash flows shareholders can appropriate from organization capital. 
As a result, shareholders of firms with organization capital are exposed to additional risks and 
demand higher returns (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013).  
 The riskiness of organization capital investment may vary across countries because key 
talent’s outside option—and thus the division of surplus from organization capital between 
shareholders and key talent—is likely to depend on the institutional features of labor markets. In 
particular, the ease with which key talent can leave a firm to pursue outside options may well 
depend on the flexibility in national labor regulations. A growing body of literature documents 
                                                 
1
 There are two widely accepted definitions of organization capital. The first focuses on organizational capabilities 
and defines organization capital as ͞an agglomeration of technologies—business practices, processes and designs, 
and incentive and compensation systems that together enable some firms to consistently and efficiently extract from 
a given level of physical and human resources a higher value of product...͟ (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005). The 
second definition, which is adopted in this paper, views organization capital as the knowledge and expertise 
embodied in a firm’s employees. This definition is consistent with previous evidence that the loss of key talent may 
negatively affect corporate outcomes. For instance, Bernstein (2015) shows that losing skilled inventors post-IPO 
leads to declines in firm innovation.   
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that less restrictive labor regulations are associated with greater job and work flows, and labor 
mobility because of increased employer leverage in terminating individual contracts and more 
outside opportunities (see, e.g., Burgess, Lane, and Stevens, 2000; Gangl, 2003; Autor, Kerr, and 
Kugler, 2007; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger, 2014). 
Moreover, when competing for key talent, firms in flexible labor markets face fewer restrictions 
regarding the contracts and remuneration packages they can offer (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, and 
Van Reenen, 2012). Therefore, the greater labor mobility and competition improve key talent’s 
outside option and increase the cost of their retention, thereby lowering the rent that shareholders 
can extract from organization capital. To the extent that labor market flexibility is associated 
with a bigger threat of key talent leaving the firms and a lower payment that shareholders can 
extract from organization capital, shareholders may consider organization capital investment to 
be riskier in more flexible labor markets. Motivated by these arguments, our main hypothesis 
asserts that the positive association between organization capital and stock returns is stronger in 
countries with more flexible labor markets. 
 To test this hypothesis, we construct a firm-level panel dataset consisting of 16,962 firms 
(131,810 firm-year observations) from 20 OECD countries over the period from 1998 to 2013. 
Our first set of tests examines whether the positive relationship between organization capital and 
stock returns is present in an international context. Following Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), we measure the stock of organization capital as capitalized 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses scaled by total assets (OC/TA). Our 
analysis shows that firms with higher organization capital have significantly higher annual buy-
and-hold stock returns. A one-standard-deviation increase in OC/TA is associated with a 3.2 
percentage point increase in annual returns. This evidence suggests that the positive relationship 
between organization capital and stock returns (henceforth OC-return relationship) is applicable 
to other countries. 
 Our second set of tests investigates whether the OC-return association increases with the 
degree of labor market flexibility. Following the previous literature (see, e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 
2005; Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 2015), we measure labor market flexibility using the 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index from the OECD. Although EPL measures the 
difficulty in hiring and firing, to a certain extent, from an employer’s perspective, less restrictive 
labor regulations are widely shown to promote labor turnover, flows, and mobility (see, e.g., 
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Autor, Kerr, and Kugler, 2007; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and 
Schweiger, 2014; Edmans, Li and, Zhang, 2016), consistent with our motivation that EPL 
captures the ease with which key talent can leave a firm to pursue outside options. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the positive relationship between 
organization capital and stock returns is significantly stronger in countries with less strict EPL. 
The economic magnitude is sizable. A move from Belgium to the US (i.e., from the least flexible 
to the second-most flexible country) increases the implied coefficient on OC/TA from 0.018 to 
0.034. In other words, a one-standard-deviation increase in OC/TA is associated with an increase 
of 2.1 percentage points and an increase of 3.9 percentage points in annual stock returns in 
Belgium and the US, respectively. Furthermore, our country-by-country analysis reveals that the 
positive OC-return association is significant in 9 of the 20 sample countries, most of which are 
ranked highly in labor flexibility. More importantly, this positive relationship increases 
monotonically from the least to the most flexible country groups, and its difference between the 
most and the least flexible country groups is significant at the 1% level, thus lending direct 
support to our hypothesis.  
We perform a number of robustness tests and confirm that our results are robust to 
controlling for the loadings to the global and regional asset pricing factors, alternative samples, 
estimation methods, as well as alternative measures of organization capital, labor market 
flexibility, and cost of capital. In subsequent analysis, we sort stocks into five portfolios and 
estimate factor model regressions on these portfolios to examine the pricing of organization 
capital risk. Consistent with our main results, our tests show that trading alpha increase 
monotonically with organization capital, suggesting that the global market, size, and value 
factors are unable to explain the anomalous returns of organization capital.  
Finally, we consider two alternative explanations relating to investment irreversibility 
and operating leverage. A natural implication of these explanations is that high-OC/TA stocks are 
riskier than low-OC/TA stocks during bad economic times and, hence, the higher returns of the 
former should operate through increased loadings to the market portfolio. To rule out these 
explanations, we estimate and document that a conditional version of the global three-factor 
model, which allows factor loadings to vary over time, fails to price the OC/TA-sorted portfolios. 
Moreover, classifying economy states into “good”, “normal”, and “bad” based on GDP growth 
and local market returns for each country, we find no evidence that high-OC/TA firms have 
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greater exposure to the global or regional market portfolios during the bad economic states. 
Overall, our findings are inconsistent with the two alternative explanations.   
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature on 
the value implications of intangible assets. Previous studies show that investment in intangible 
assets, such as Research and Development (R&D) (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), 
employee satisfaction (Edmans, 2011), human capital (Eiling, 2013), and innovative efficiency 
(Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013), is associated with abnormal stock returns. With regard to 
organization capital, Lev, Radhakrishnan, and Zhang (2009) find that firms with high 
organization capital earn significantly higher future abnormal stock returns. Building on the 
notion that organization capital is embodied in key talent, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) posit 
that shareholders require risk premia for investing in firms with organization capital. This paper 
is the first to investigate the link between organization capital and stock returns in an 
international context. We present new evidence that the positive association between 
organization capital and stock returns is more pronounced in more flexible labor markets, 
consistent with greater labor mobility and competition for key talent rendering organization 
capital investment riskier for shareholders. 
Second, we contribute to the literature by validating capitalized SG&A expenses as a 
proxy of organization capital. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) argue that most of the expenditures 
that increase organization capital (e.g., IT expenditures, employees’ training costs, advertising 
expenses, etc.) are included in this income statement item. However, because SG&A expenses 
may include items that do not improve organization capital, the validity of this measure must be 
empirically verified. Although prior studies have validated this measure in the US market 
(Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Shen, 2017), its validity for non-US firms has yet 
to be examined. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to offer validation tests in an 
international setting and show that capitalized SG&A expenses capture firm productivity, 
innovative efficiency, and managerial quality well. 
Finally, our paper also relates to a number of studies examining the country-level 
determinants of asset pricing anomalies. For instance, Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 
(2007) find that the accrual anomaly is stronger in countries with a more extensive use of accrual 
accounting and a lower share ownership concentration. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) show that 
the returns to momentum investment strategies are higher in countries characterized by greater 
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individualism. For its part, our study reveals that the positive OC-return association is an 
international rather than a local manifestation, and varies across national labor markets. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our data and variables. 
Section 3 presents our empirical tests and reports the results. Section 4 presents the results of 
additional analyses, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Variables 
 Data  
Our sample covers firms from 20 OECD countries over the period from 1998 to 2013. Following 
Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2012), a firm’s country is that of its primary listing. For non-US 
firms, we download their annual financial information, and daily and monthly stock prices from 
Compustat Global, and translate them into US dollars using exchange rates from Thomson 
Reuters or the Bank of England (whichever is available). For the US sample, we include stocks 
listed on the AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ, and obtain their financial and market information 
from the Compustat North America and CRSP databases. The daily stock prices are used to 
calculate weekly returns for estimating factor exposure. The monthly prices and returns are used 
for calculating annual buy-and-hold returns, which are the main outcome variable for most 
analyses in our paper. All financial firms are excluded. Observations that are unmerged and have 
negative values in book equity are discarded. Industry classification is constructed using the 
Fama-French 49 industry classification (our results are robust to using the 4-digit Global 
Industry Classification Standard). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to reduce the effects of outliers.  
Our final sample consists of 16,962 firms (131,810 firm-year observations) from 20 
countries. As Table 1 shows, the five countries with the most observations are the US (34.3%), 
Japan (25.9%), the UK (8.7%), Australia (7.6%), and Germany (5.1%). Detailed breakdowns by 
country and year, and by industry and year of our sample can be found in Table IA.1 of the 
Internet Appendix. 
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 Variables 
2.2.1. Measuring organization capital 
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), we adopt the perpetual inventory method and 
estimate a firm’s stock of organization capital by capitalizing SG&A expenses. A substantial 
share of the reported SG&A expenses consists of costs related to employee training, information 
technology, and brand promotion, most of which would improve labor efficiency (Lev and 
Radhakrishnan, 2005). Since any accrued value from these expenditures cannot be attributed to a 
specific unit of output and is shared by key talent, SG&A expenditure can be considered an 
investment in organization capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013).2  
Under the perpetual inventory method, we estimate a firm’s stock of organization capital 
by recursively cumulating its deflated value of SG&A expenses as follows: 
OCit = (1 – įO) · OCit-1 + (SG&Ait  / cpit)    (1) 
where įO is the depreciation rate, and cpit is the US consumer price index. For a given firm we 
begin the recursive estimation after it has first appeared in the Compustat Global or Compustat 
North America databases. For non-US firms, SG&A expenses are translated into US dollars 
before they are deflated. Following prior studies (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; Li, Qiu, and 
Shen, 2017), we treat missing SG&A expenses as zero. The initial stock of organization capital is 
defined as follows: 
OC0 = SG&A1 / (g + įO)    (2) 
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), we use a depreciation rate (įO) of 15% and a 
growth rate (g) of 10%.3 We scale the stock of organization capital by total assets (OC/TA) and 
use it as our main independent variable throughout the paper.  
                                                 
2
 Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find that US firms with higher capitalized SG&A expenses to total assets ratios 
are more likely to consider loss of talent as a risk factor, to spend more on information technology, be more 
productive after controlling for capital and labor, and have better managerial quality. Lev, Radhakrishnan, and 
Zhang (2009) find that capitalized SG&A expenses capture managerial quality, as shown by its positive association 
with both executive compensation and pay-for-performance. Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017) find that organization capital 
is significantly and positively related to higher average ranks in the Fortune magazine’s ͞100 Best Companies to 
Work for in America͟ list and the Computerworld’s ͞100 Best Places to Work in IT͟ list. 
3
 A depreciation rate of 15% has been used since 2006 by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis to estimate the stock 
of R&D capital (Li, 2012). Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) match the growth rate, g, to the average real growth 
rate of SG&A expenses in their US sample, which is 10%. In our sample, the average real growth rate of SG&A 
expenses is 12%. Our results hold when an alternative growth rate of 12% is used. We also follow Li, Qiu, and Shen 
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2.2.2. Measuring labor market flexibility 
We measure labor market flexibility using the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index 
from the OECD. The EPL index measures the restrictiveness in national labor regulations in the 
protection of labor in dismissals and the use of temporary contracts in hiring. Since the EPL 
index is computed using national labor legislations and thus captures changes in institutions, it is 
less likely to reflect changes in macroeconomic conditions. There are three components in EPL: 
individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts (EPR), additional costs of collective 
dismissals (EPC), and regulation of temporary contracts (EPT). EPR measures dismissal 
protection for employees with regular contracts and covers issues relating to the procedural 
inconvenience of dismissal faced by employers. EPC measures the additional regulations, 
provisions, notifications, and costs required for collective dismissals over and above those 
involved in individual dismissals. EPT measures the regulations used in fixed-term and 
temporary labor contracts in terms of the maximum number of successive contracts, restrictions 
on renewing temporary contracts, maximum cumulated duration, and the legality of fixed-term 
and temporary contracts.4 Following prior studies (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Simintzi, Vig, and 
Volpin, 2015; Edmans, Li, and Zhang, 2016), we define EPL as the equally weighted average of 
EPR, EPC, and EPT. For a more convenient interpretation, we multiply EPL by negative one 
such that higher values indicate greater labor market flexibility.  
Undeniably, EPL is imperfect in measuring key talent’s outside option because it 
captures labor regulations relating to restrictions in hiring and firing, to a certain extent, from an 
employer’s perspective. However, EPL is shown in the extant labor economics literature to be 
significant in determining labor supply, and job and worker flows. For instance, Gangl (2003) 
argues that labor protection reduces mobility due to lower leverage in terminating individual 
contracts by employers and reduced external opportunities for employees. Analyzing the 
adoptions of wrongful-discharge laws across U.S. states, Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) 
document that less protective labor regulations are associated with greater employment flows and 
firm entry rates. Using a cross-country sample in the 1990s, both Gómez-Salvador, Messina, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2017) and repeat our analysis using the industry average real growth rate of SG&A expenses for each year, and our 
results hold. 
4 For more details on these components and the construction of EPL, please refer to: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/EPL-Methodology.pdf.  
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Vallanti (2004), and Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2014) document that more stringent 
hiring and firing regulations are associated with reduced job flows and reallocation. Similarly, 
Messina and Vallanti (2007) find that less strict EPL is associated with greater job destructions 
and creations in sectors with declining growth. Relatedly, Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2016) argue 
and document that employee satisfaction is particularly important for countries with less strict 
EPL because competitors face fewer constraints in hiring away key talent. The authors also find 
that the time-series mean of EPL is positively correlated with labor turnover with a coefficient of 
over 0.7 using data from 7 OECD countries.  
Despite this extant evidence on the link between EPL and labor flows reviewed above, 
we perform an additional test to shed further light on the validity of EPL in capturing job and 
worker flows (the definitions of these job and worker flow measures follow Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999, pp. 2716-2717) and OECD (2009, pp. 122-123)). We collected the country-
average (across the years 1997-2004) job reallocation (defined as the sum of job creation and 
destruction) and excess job reallocation (defined as total job reallocation minus the absolute 
value of the difference between job creation and job destruction) rates for 6 European countries 
in our sample, and the country-average (across the years 1998-2005) worker reallocation 
(defined as the sum of total hiring and separations) and excess worker reallocation rates (defined 
as total worker reallocation minus the absolute value of the difference between job creation and 
destruction) for 13 European sample countries from OECD (2009). We then computed pairwise 
correlations between these job and worker flow measures and the time-series average EPL 
(calculated across the years of 1998-2005). In unreported results, we find that the correlations 
between EPL and the two job reallocation rates, and those between EPL and the two worker 
reallocation rates are all above 0.5. While the correlations for the job reallocation rates are 
insignificant (nonetheless subjected to a small sample problem), those for the worker 
reallocations are significant at the 10% level or better (for more details, please see Table IA.3 of 
the Internet Appendix).  
Overall, this evidence is consistent with our motivation that employees in flexible labor 
markets may find it less difficult to leave the firms to pursue outside options. In subsequent 
robustness tests, we employ an alternative industry-level measure of labor mobility and confirm 
that our conclusions are unchanged. 
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2.2.3. Estimating systematic risk  
It is important that we control for systematic risk in our analysis. Since systematic risk is 
unobserved, we estimate it using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In an international 
setting, CAPM could hold globally or locally depending on the degree of financial and economic 
integration. The local CAPM holds when local markets are fully segmented, and the global 
CAPM holds when local markets are fully integrated. As pointed out by several studies (see, e.g., 
Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Baele, 2005), the process of market integration may not proceed 
smoothly. A pertinent example is that frictions in labor markets induced by employment 
protection laws may segment markets, implying that risk models may differ across labor markets. 
In light of this issue, instead of choosing the global or local CAPM a priori, we follow Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Zhang (2009) and choose a model specification with a maximum flexibility. In this 
model, returns depend on both the global and regional market portfolios, and the size and value 
factors. The pricing factors are downloaded from Professor Kenneth French’s data library (for 
more details about factor construction, please see Fama and French, 2012). We use regional 
factors instead of country factors as local factors because Brooks and Del Negro (2005) show 
that regional factors mostly explain the country factors within-region. 
 To allow the factor loadings to vary over time, we use weekly returns (Wednesday-to-
Wednesday) and estimate the following time-series regression for each stock in each calendar 
year: 
ri,t - rft = αi + ȕWMKTi WMKTt + ȕWSMBi WSMBt + ȕWHMLi WHMLt 
ȕRMKTi RMKTt + ȕRSMBi RSMBt + ȕRHMLi RHMLt + İt    (3) 
where ri,t is the weekly returns for stock i in week t, WMKTt is the excess returns of the global 
market portfolio, WSMBt is the return of the global Small-Minus-Big (SMB) size portfolio, and 
WHMLt is the return of the global High-Minus-Low (HML) value portfolio. RMKTt is the excess 
returns of the regional market portfolio, RSMBt is the return of the regional SMB size portfolio, 
RHMLt is the return of the regional HML value portfolio, and İt is the residual term. Following 
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009), each of the three regional pricing factors is orthogonalized 
with respect to the global three factors using a time-series regression on the latter. These 
regressions are conducted every calendar year, and their residuals are the new regional factors 
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used in equation (3).5 A minimum of 26 weeks is required for the estimation. To be precise, our 
analysis uses factor loadings estimated using weekly returns within calendar year t-1 to explain 
annual buy-and-hold stock returns in fiscal year t.6 
  
2.2.4. Firm and country control variables 
We control for a number of firm and country characteristics in our analysis. Firm size is 
measured by log market capitalization (Ln(ME)), and the value effects are captured by the log 
book-to-market equity ratio (Ln(BM)) (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1993); profitability is 
measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets (ROA); R&D intensity 
is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales (R&D/Sale); Leverage is measured as 
the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets; capital intensity is measured 
as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (CAPX/TA); asset tangibility is calculated as net 
property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets (Asset tangibility). Finally, to account for a 
firm’s operations in foreign markets, we construct an indicator variable (Foreign currency 
indicator) that equals one when it reports a nonzero value of foreign currency adjustments, and 
zero otherwise. 
As for country characteristics, we collect the rule of law index (Rule of law) from La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) that measures the degree of tradition in law 
and order, with smaller values for less traditions. Second, we collect the revised anti-directors 
rights index (Anti-directors rights index) from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008). The anti-directors rights index measures the degree of legal protection on minority 
shareholders, which ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating stronger investor 
protection. Third, we collect the individualism index (Individualism) from Professor Hofstede’s 
homepage, capturing how individualistic or collectivistic a nation is. Fourth, we control for stock 
market development as measured by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (Stock Cap to 
GDP) (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997). Fifth, we use the ratio of total private credit to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to capture the degree of financial market development (Financial 
development) (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Sixth, we use log real GDP per capita (in 2005 US 
                                                 
5
 Note that the orthogonalization does not affect the model, but only simplifies the interpretation of the betas. In an 
earlier version of this paper, our results based on the unorthogonalized regional factor loadings are very similar. 
6
 This empirical choice is made for the sake of computational efficiency for the estimation of factor loadings.    
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dollars) (Ln(GDP per capita)) and the rate of change in real GDP (GDP growth) to control for 
the effects of income level and economic growth on stock returns, respectively. Finally, to 
control for macroeconomic uncertainty, we include the rate of change of the national consumer 
price index (CPI growth) (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2006).  
 The detailed definitions and descriptions of the above firm and country control variables 
can be found in Appendix A.1. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by country. Consistent with US firms investing more in 
firm-specific human capital, the mean OC/TA for US firms is 1.23, ranking third among our 20 
sample countries. The other four countries investing most heavily in organization capital (OC/TA) 
are the UK (1.38), Japan (1.31), Sweden (1.041), and Denmark (1.036). As for labor market 
flexibility, the US is the second-most flexible market according to EPL. The remaining four of 
the top five most flexible countries are New Zealand (-0.79), Canada (-1.38), the UK (-1.48), and 
Ireland (-1.65).7  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics. For firm size, the mean (median) deflated total assets 
are US$2.26 (US$0.28) billion. The mean (median) OC/TA is 1.073 (0.750), and the mean 
(median) annual buy-and-hold return is 15.5% (5.2%). The univariate comparison (median 
breakpoint) shows that high-OC/TA firms earn higher stock returns, are smaller, and less levered 
than low-OC/TA firms on average. These differences are significant at the 1% level in both mean 
and median tests. These statistics are consistent with the notion that high-OC/TA firms are riskier 
than low-OC/TA firms. If high-OC/TA firms have higher discount rates, their valuations should 
be lower (Berk, 1995). Likewise, if cash flows are riskier among these firms, leverage is 
expected to be lower under standard trade-off theory (Leland, 1994). Consistent with the view 
that organization capital is an important factor of production, firm productive efficiency, 
measured as the ratio of sales to total assets, is significantly higher for the high-OC/TA firms. 
Moreover, high-OC/TA firms have lower systematic risk, captured by both global and regional 
                                                 
7
 For more convenient interpretation, we multiply EPL by negative one. As a result, all values of EPL are negative, 
and less negative values of EPL indicate greater labor market flexibility. 
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market betas, higher global and regional size factor loadings, and lower global and regional value 
factor loadings. Overall, these statistics are largely consistent with those reported by Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Validating the SG&A measure of organization capital in our non-US sample 
We begin by evaluating the validity of capitalized SG&A expenses in measuring organization 
capital. Our estimated stock of organization capital are measured with errors because SG&A 
expenses may include items unrelated to investment in organization capital. Although capitalized 
SG&A expenses measure organization capital well in the US market (see, e.g., Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Shen, 2017), its validity in other markets has not been verified. 
Arguably, the extent to which SG&A expenses capture investment in organization capital may 
differ across countries due to differences in institutional settings, such as accounting standards, 
corporate governance, etc. Therefore, we perform several validation tests for the SG&A measure 
in our non-US sample. 
 First, since organization capital is an important factor of production, we test whether 
firms with high capitalized SG&A expenses have higher productive efficiency, measured by the 
sales-to-asset ratio (Sale/TA). In our non-US firm-year panel, we regress Sale/TA on OC/TA, firm 
size, and fixed effects. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that capitalized SG&A expenses are 
positively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with Sale/TA. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 Second, due to their superior business processes, knowledge capital, and technologies, we 
expect firms with higher organization capital to have greater innovation outputs and efficiency. 
Since patent data for international firms is not readily available, we collect country-level 
innovation data instead and examine whether country-average capitalized SG&A expenses are 
associated with these innovation measures. For each of the 19 non-US sample countries, we 
collected four country-level measures of innovation outputs and efficiency: the number of triadic 
patent families (TPF) from the OECD (2015)8, the total number of patents (Patent) granted by 
                                                 
8
 Triadic patent families are sets of patents filed to protect the same invention at these three major patent offices 
(OECD, 2015): the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  
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the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), total R&D expenditures (in 2005 US 
dollars) (R&D) from the OECD, and the ratio of Patent to R&D. These innovation proxies are 
natural logarithm transformed. To isolate the effects of the SG&A measure from those of 
macroeconomic factors, we control for the country characteristics as discussed in Section 2.2.4 
and year fixed effects in the regressions, and cluster standard errors at the country level. As 
columns (2) to (5) show, the country-average SG&A expenses are positively and significantly (at 
the 5% level or better) associated with all four measures of innovation, suggesting that the 
SG&A measure is informative about innovative efficiency. 
 Third, considering that firms with high organization capital tend to have higher 
managerial efficiency (Lev, Radhakrishnan, and Zhang, 2009; Li, Qiu, and Shen, 2017), the 
SG&A measure should correlate positively with the quality of management. To test this, we 
collect the managerial practices scores (Managerial Practices Scores), constructed based on 
interview-based survey evidence, for 11 of the 19 non-US sample countries from Bloom, 
Genakos, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) (Table 2 of their paper). Regressing Managerial 
Practices Scores on the (full sample) average SG&A measure, column (6) reveals a positive and 
significant (at the 10% level) association between the SG&A measure and Managerial Practices 
Scores, consistent with our conjecture.    
Insert Table 4 about here 
Although this finding is encouraging, the power of this test is limited because of the small 
sample problem. In unreported analysis, we estimate a firm-level measure of managerial ability 
(Managerial ability scores) following the procedure outlined in Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 
(2012). Regressing Managerial ability scores on OC/TA, firm size, and industry and year fixed 
effects for each country, we find that the coefficients for OC/TA are positive in all countries and 
are significant at the 10% level or better in 11 of the 19 (57.9%) non-US countries. When 
pooling the countries together, the regression yields a significant (at the 1% level) coefficient 
estimate for OC/TA of 0.064. These results suggest that the SG&A measure captures managerial 
ability well (for more details, please see Table IA.4 of the Internet Appendix).9 
                                                 
9
 Note that given that the dependent variable, Managerial ability scores, is measured with errors, the estimated 
standard errors of the independent variables would be inflated whereas the coefficients will remain consistently 
estimated (Hausman, 2001). 
16 
 
Overall, our validation test results confirm that capitalized SG&A expenses capture the 
qualitative characteristics of organization capital well and are valid in our international sample. 
 
 Organization capital and stock returns 
Having validated the SG&A measure of organization capital, we now examine whether OC/TA 
explains stock returns in our international sample using the following model: 
RETit = Ȗh + λk + νt + į · OC/TAit-1 + ζ · Xit-1 + İit,                                  (4) 
where i, h, k, and t index the firm, industry, country, and year, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the annual buy-and-hold stock returns (RET) of firm i in year t. Industry (Ȗh), country 
(λk), and year (νt) fixed effects are controlled for in the model. Xit-1 is a vector of firm and country 
control variables as defined in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, lagged one year to alleviate the reverse 
causality concern; İit is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to account 
for serial correlations. A positive coefficient (į) for OC/TA would be consistent with 
shareholders demanding more compensation for holding firms with higher organization capital 
(Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). 
 Table 4 reports the estimation results. Column (1) reveals a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between organization capital and stock returns, consistent with the US-
based evidence from Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Columns (2) and (3) show that this 
finding is robust to the inclusion of firm control variables and the global and regional factor 
loadings. Column (4) augments the model with five country variables, Stock Cap to GDP, 
Financial Development, Ln(GDP per capita), GDP growth, and CPI growth10, and shows that 
our results hold. Economically, the magnitude of the coefficient on OC/TA is sizable and stable 
across specifications. Based on the estimates from column (4), a one-standard-deviation increase 
in OC/TA (1.175) is associated with a 3.2-percentage-point increase in stock returns, 
corresponding to a 20.5% increase relative to sample mean.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
As for the control variables, their coefficient estimates are in line with the prior literature. 
In particular, we document a significantly positive value effect and a significantly negative size 
                                                 
10
 We do not include the rule of law index, anti-director rights index, and individualism index in column (4) because 
these variables are time-invariant by construction and absorbed by the country fixed effects.  
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effect (Fama and French, 1993). Profitability is positively and significantly associated with stock 
returns (Fama and French, 2008). The global market, size, and value factors, and the regional 
value factor enter significantly (at the 10% level or better) into columns (3) and (4), suggesting 
that they are significantly priced in the cross section of international stock returns. More 
importantly, however, these results show that existing pricing factors are unable to explain away 
the anomalous returns associated with organization capital. 
In summary, our findings support the theoretical prediction by Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013). The documented positive association between organization capital and stock returns is 
statistically significant and economically meaningful, and appears to be generalizable to other 
countries. 
 
 Organization capital, labor market flexibility and stock returns 
To the extent that firms are exposed to greater risks associated with higher outside options of key 
talent in more flexible labor markets, organization capital risk premia are likely to be higher in 
such national labor markets. To test this hypothesis, we augment equation (4) with the interaction 
between OC/TA and EPL as follows: 
RETit = Ȗh + λk + νt + į · OC/TAit-1 + ζ · EPδkt-1+ θ · (OC/TAit-1 × EPLkt-1) + ȕ · Xit-1 + İit, (5) 
where EPL is the labor market flexibility index. The coefficient on the interacted term between 
OC/TA and EPL, θ, is of our main interest. A significant and positive θ would be consistent with 
our hypothesis that investors demand higher return on investment in organization capital in more 
flexible labor markets. To isolate the effect of labor market flexibility from other potential 
confounding country factors, we control for the interaction between OC/TA and the eight control 
variables (as defined in Section 2.2.4) in the estimation.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 Table 5 reports these results. In column (1) where only OC/TA, EPL, their interacted term, 
and fixed effects are included, the coefficients on OC/TA and EPL are both positive and highly 
significant. More importantly, the interacted term (OC/TA×EPL) is also significantly positive, 
consistent with our hypothesis. Column (2) shows that the results hold after controlling for the 
firm characteristics, and the global and regional factor loadings. In column (3), after we account 
for the country control variables and their interaction with OC/TA, the interacted term between 
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organization capital and the EPL index (OC/TA×EPL) becomes considerably larger and remains 
significant at the 1% level.  
To gauge the economic significance of our findings, we compare the implied coefficients 
on OC/TA between the least flexible country, Belgium (mean EPL=-3.137), and the second most 
flexible country, the US (mean EPL=-1.130). Specifically, we calculate the sum of the product of 
the country-specific average country characteristics (including EPL) with the estimated 
coefficients of their interaction terms with OC/TA, and then add to it the estimated coefficient of 
OC/TA to obtain the implied coefficients on OC/TA for both countries. Our calculations show 
that moving from Belgium to the US increases the implied coefficient on OC/TA from 0.018 to 
0.034. In other words, a one-standard-deviation increase in OC/TA is associated with an increase 
of 2.1 percentage points and an increase of 3.9 percentage points in annual stock returns in 
Belgium and the US, respectively. The details of these calculations can be found in Table IA.5 of 
the Internet Appendix. 
 Overall, the results support our hypothesis that shareholders consider investment in 
organization capital to be riskier in more flexible labor markets and thus require higher expected 
returns as compensation. 
 
 Country-by-country analysis 
To examine whether the positive OC-return relationship holds across countries, we follow 
Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012) and estimate the baseline regressions of 
equation (4) separately for each of our 20 sample countries. Since statistical power of the 
regressions can be constrained for countries with a small number of available observations, we 
rank the countries from low to high (based on the average EPL reported in Table 1) and 
consecutively divide every four countries into a group to increase the power of the tests. We then 
estimate the baseline regressions for each country and each country group. To make the 
coefficients more comparable, we normalize OC/TA to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation within each country and each country group. The firm and country controls are 
identical to those in the baseline models. Industry and year fixed effects are included in each 
country regression, and industry, country, and year fixed effects are controlled for in the country 
group regressions. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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 Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients and firm-clustered robust standard errors for 
OC/TA, the adjusted R2, and the number of observations for each regression. We find that 19 of 
20 countries have positive coefficient estimates on OC/TA, among which 9 of them are 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Consistent with our hypothesis, these 
significant coefficients are mostly documented in countries that rank highly in terms of labor 
market flexibility. When we partition our sample into 4-country groups, the coefficients on 
OC/TA in the five groups are all positive and significant, and increase monotonically from the 
least to the most flexible country groups. The difference in coefficients on OC/TA between the 
most and the least flexible country groups is significant at the 1% level.  
Overall, the OC-return relationship appears to hold internationally, and the organization 
capital risk premia increase with labor market flexibility. 
 
 Robustness tests 
In this section, we present the results of our robustness tests (based on equation (5)) in Table 7. 
To save space, we only report some of the tests and leave the remaining ones in the Internet 
Appendix. For those reported, we only report estimates for their main variables of interest, and 
keep their unabridged versions in the Internet Appendix. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 First, organization capital is measured with errors if certain SG&A expenses are 
unrelated to organization capital investment, such as audit fees, taxes, restructuring expenses, 
and managerial perk consumption (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005). Since the composition of 
SG&A expenses is often governed by industry-specific accounting practices, such measurement 
errors may have an industry component. To address this concern, we industry-adjust OC/TA by 
subtracting the country-specific industry mean from a firm’s OC/TA, and then dividing the de-
meaned value by its (cross-sectional) standard deviation. Column (1) shows that our results are 
robust to the industry adjustment. In columns (2) and (3), we use alternative depreciation rates, 
30% and 50%, for capitalizing SG&A expenses and document similar results. Column (4) 
excludes the first 5 years of OC/TA observations to reduce the effect of initial stock assumption 
and shows that our results hold. Column (5) uses the ratio of SG&A expenses to total assets as an 
alternative flow measure of organization capital and reports similar results (for more details, 
please see Table IA.6 of the Internet Appendix). 
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Next, we check the robustness of our results to alternative samples. Given that high-OC 
stocks tend to be small, and that small stocks in general earn higher returns (Banz, 1981), our 
results might have been driven by a size effect. Removing stocks in the lowest quartile based on 
market capitalization (i.e., below US$49.2 million, down to 98,857 observations), column (6) 
shows that our results are robust to excluding the smallest stocks. Another concern is that 
countries with more observations may be over-represented in the regressions. Column (7) 
excludes the US and Japan―the two countries with the largest number of observations in our 
sample―and shows that our results continue to hold after the sample attribution (down to 52,521 
observations (39.8% of the full sample)). Moreover, since the 2007-09 global financial crisis 
represents major structural changes to stock markets and EPL in many countries (Simintzi, Vig, 
and Volpin, 2015), column (8) excludes the financial crisis years (2007-09) and shows that our 
results continue to hold. Columns (9) and (10) re-estimate equation (5) on subsamples before and 
after the global financial crisis, confirming that our results are not primarily driven by the 
financial crisis (these unabridged results can be found in Table IA.7 of the Internet Appendix). 
Furthermore, we use an alternative labor market flexibility index (Flex index), computed 
as the average of three subindexes from the World Bank Group: the Difficulty-of-hiring index, 
Rigidity-of-labor-hour index, and Difficulty-of-firing index.11 Available for the years 2004-2013, 
Flex index is scaled to lie between 0 and 1, and multiplied by negative one for easier 
interpretation. Replacing EPL with Flex index in equation (5), column (11) shows that the 
positive OC-return relationship increases significantly with Flex index. In particular, the implied 
coefficient of OC/TA changes from -0.001 to 0.030 when moving from France (with the lowest 
average Flex index: -0.626) to the US (with the highest average Flex index: -0.056), consistent 
with our earlier findings (the unabridged results are reported in Table IA.8; the calculations of 
economic magnitude are shown in Panels C and D of Table IA.5; a country-by-country analysis 
using Flex index is reported in Table IA.9 of the Internet Appendix).12  
                                                 
11
 The Difficulty-of-hiring index measures the regulations on the use of fixed-term employment contracts; the 
Rigidity-of-labor-hour index measures restrictions on labor hours; and the Difficulty-of-firing index measures the 
extent to which priority rules and notifications and approvals to a third party are required when firing employees on 
an individual or group basis and whether redundancy is permitted as the basis for firing employees. 
12
 Note that the coefficient on Flex index is negative and significant whereas the coefficient on EPL is significantly 
positive in the baseline model of Table 5. Such difference is likely due to the differences in methodologies used in 
constructing the two indexes. In particular, Flex index is the average of three subindexes, each of which is 
normalized to lie between 0 and 100 using all sample countries available in that year. In other words, Flex index is a 
relative rank variable that is meaningful in the cross section, but perhaps less comparable across time. For instance, a 
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Moreover, realized returns are an arguably noisy proxy for expected returns on equity 
capital (see, e.g., Blume and Friend, 1973; Elton, 1999). The accounting literature offers 
alternative methods to estimate expected returns without using realized returns or any asset 
pricing models. Instead, these methods use analysts’ earnings forecasts as proxies for expected 
cash flows and apply accounting valuation models to estimate implied costs of capital (ICC). 
However, estimating ICC is challenging in our setting because data on analysts’ earnings 
forecast is limited for international firms, which introduces self-selection problems or 
survivorship bias to our sample. To overcome these challenges, we forecast earnings with a 
profitability model of Hou, Van Dijk, and Zhang (2012), and apply the model-based earnings 
forecasts to estimate ICCs using three widely applied valuation models: Gordon and Gordon 
(1997) (ICC_GG), Easton (2004) (ICC_MPEG), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
(ICC_OJ). To reduce measurement errors, we compute a composite ICC (ICC_AVG) by equally 
averaging the three ICCs. The details about the model specifications, summary statistics, and 
correlation analysis of the ICCs can be found in Tables IA.12 and IA.13 of the Internet Appendix. 
Consistent with our main results, in column (12) where ICC_AVG is the dependent variable, we 
find that the interaction term OC/TA×EPL enters positively and significantly into the model, 
suggesting that this concern does not drive our results. 
Another potential concern is that in our sample, EPL is constant over time for three 
countries: the US, Canada, and Switzerland. The lack of within-country variation in EPL for 
these countries may cause problems with country fixed effects in the baseline models. For 
robustness, we find that dropping the country fixed effects in equation (5) does not affect our 
results. Moreover, we estimate a multi-level mixed effects model with industry and year fixed 
                                                                                                                                                             
country without any changes in labor regulations could be assigned a different relative scores in a given year due to 
changes in labor regulations in other countries. Indeed, in unreported analysis, we find that EPL and Flex index are 
similar cross-sectionally but differ substantially in the time series, and that Flex index is much more volatile over 
time. To explore this issue further, we calculate two sets of pairwise correlations between the two indexes, one by 
year (in a cross-sectional sense) and the other one by country (in a time-series sense). We find that the average 
cross-sectional correlation coefficient (averaged across the years) is 0.67 whereas the average time-series correlation 
coefficient (averaged across the countries) is only 0.02. Moreover, the correlations calculated cross-sectionally are 
stable across years but those calculated using time-series information differ substantially across countries. In 
unreported results, we exclude eight countries where the correlations computed using time-series information are 
negative and re-estimate equation (5). We find that the coefficients on EPL and Flex index no longer differ in signs 
and are both positive and insignificant. More importantly, the coefficients on the interaction between both indexes 
and OC/TA remain positive and highly significant (for more details, please see Table IA.10 and IA.11 of the Internet 
Appendix).  
22 
 
effects, and country random effects, finding that our results hold (for more details, please see 
Table IA.14 of the Internet Appendix).  
Although we have included an extensive set of country controls and have used country 
fixed effects to sweep out time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across countries, EPL could 
still capture other omitted country characteristics that may influence the OC-return association. 
To reduce this concern, we consider five additional country controls. The first is average wages 
from OECD to account for wage differentials across countries which could potentially be 
determined by EPL and also drive stock returns. The second is political risk, measured by the 
corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. The third set of 
controls are three indicators for whether a country's Commercial/Company law is based on the 
British, French, and German legal origins, and zero otherwise, from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The fourth is the degree of financial opaqueness, defined as the 
average of the country-level Center for International Financial Analysis and Research ratings in 
1991, 1993, and 1995 following Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012). The final 
control is a country index of differences between local Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS), collected from Bae, Tan, 
and Welker (2008). Including these additional controls and their interaction with OC/TA in 
equation (5) does not affect our main results (for more details, please see Table IA.15 of the 
Internet Appendix). 
Under full market integration and the assumption that firms have the same systematic risk 
within-industry, industry systematic risk (i.e., exposure to the global market portfolio) should be 
the same across countries (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel, 2011). An implication is that 
industry fixed effects can, to a certain extent, capture systematic risk in our sample. Indeed, the 
robustness of our findings to industry fixed effects reinforces that the higher returns of high OC-
stocks cannot be explained by factor exposure to the global market portfolio. As a further check 
and to reduce measurement errors, we adopt an alternative industry portfolio approach in 
estimating factor exposure. Specifically, we combine stocks in a given country into industry 
portfolios (Fama-French 49 industries) and compute their value-weighted portfolio weekly 
returns. We estimate equation (3) for each industry in a given country every year and assign the 
estimated loadings to all stocks in that industry. Since equation (3) is estimated for each industry-
country pair yearly, industry systematic risk is allowed to vary across countries and time. Thus, 
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this approach does not require the assumption of full market integration and is generally more 
flexible. Our baseline results (unreported) are robust to this alternative estimation approach for 
factor exposure (for more details, please see Table IA.16 of the Internet Appendix). 
 Finally, we test whether labor regulations directly influence firms’ or employees’ 
decisions to invest in organization capital and its efficiency. In more flexible markets, employees, 
who can move across firms and more easily, may place a greater value on general skills and thus 
invest less in firm-specific human capital. At the same time, the greater threat of losing key 
employees in highly flexible labor markets may deter firms from investing in firm-specific 
human capital, such as employee trainings, etc. In untabulated tests, our results based on EPL 
and Flex index are less than consistent. On one hand, we find that EPL is insignificant in 
explaining the flow of organization capital investment (defined as the ratio of SG&A expenses to 
total assets) and the productivity of organization capital (defined as the ratio of sales or earnings, 
to organization capital). On the other hand, Flex index is associated with a significantly lower 
flow of organization capital investment but a significantly higher productivity of organization 
capital. Overall, given this somewhat mixed, exploratory evidence, we are careful not to draw 
conclusions from these results, but rather conclude that our main results, which are based on EPL, 
are less likely to be driven by the endogenous response of firms and employees to changes in 
labor market regulations (for more details, please see Table IA.17 of the Internet Appendix).  
 
4. Additional analysis 
 Heterogeneity in labor mobility across industries 
Since EPL is imperfect in measuring key talent’s outside option, we examine the heterogeneity 
in labor mobility across industries in this section. Since industry labor mobility data is not readily 
available for our non-US sample countries, we collect such data from Donangelo (2014) for the 
US firms and apply them to industries of the remaining sample countries. Following Donangelo 
(2014), labor mobility (Labor mobility) is defined as the average inter-industry occupational 
dispersion of employed workers in an industry. The rationale is that workers with occupations 
concentrated in a few industries, i.e., with low inter-industry occupational dispersion, face fewer 
opportunities to switch across industries and thus have lower mobility. Therefore, in industries 
with a lower (higher) average inter-occupational dispersion, labor is less mobile and generally 
finds it more difficult (easier) to leave the firms.  
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Based on the sample median of Labor mobility, we divide the US Fama-French 49 
industries into high and low mobility groups each year, apply the industry mobility classification 
to industries of the remaining 19 non-US countries, and construct an indicator for the mobile 
industries (High mobility (FF49) (Median)). We then estimate the following model: 
 RETit = Ȗh + λk + νt + į · OC/TAit-1 + ζ · High mobility (FF49)it-1+ θ · (OC/TAit-1 × High 
mobility (FF49)it-1) + ȕ · Xit-1 + İit.  (6) 
where Xit-1 is a vector of firm and country controls identical to those in the baseline model. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A positive estimated θ would support our 
hypothesis. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Table 8 reports the estimation of equation (6). As column (1) shows, the coefficient for 
OC/TA×High mobility (FF49) (Median) is 0.018 and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
consistent with our hypothesis. In column (2), we divide the 2-digit SIC industries into high and 
low groups according to the sample median Labor mobility, and similarly construct an indicator 
for mobile industries, documenting similar results. For robustness, in columns (3) and (4), 
instead of sample median, we use an alternative breakpoint at the 70th percentile for dividing the 
industries. Our results show similarly that the positive OC-return association is significantly 
stronger for the top 30% mobile industries.  
 Overall, these findings confirm our earlier results based on EPL and similarly show that 
investment in organization capital is riskier when labor is more mobile or when key talent face 
less difficulty to leave the firms to pursue outside options. 
 
 Factor Model Regressions 
In addition to the pooled cross-sectional regression framework previously employed, this section 
estimates factor model regressions to study whether organization capital risk is priced. At the end 
of June each year, within each country-industry (based on the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification) pair, we divide stocks into five groups based on their fiscal year t-1 OC/TA. 
Sorting stocks within country-industry pairs helps to remove the country-specific industry 
components in the measurement errors of organization capital. We require a minimum of 10 
stocks within a country-industry pair for the sort. We then combine stocks with the same 
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portfolio rank to form five equally (EW) and value (VW) weighted portfolios across all sample 
countries and calculate their average returns (in US dollars) from July of year t to June of year 
t+1. The portfolio p’s monthly returns (rp,t) in US dollars in excess of the risk-free rate are 
regressed on the excess returns of the global market portfolio (WMKTt), and the global size 
(WSMBt) and value (WHMLt) factors. The factor model regression can be written as follows:  
rp,t - rft = αp + ȕWMKTp WMKTt + ȕWSMBp WSMBt + ȕWHMLp WHMLt + İt   (7) 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 9 reports the average portfolio returns, estimated alphas and 
factor loadings, adjusted R-squared, and number of monthly observations for the five EW (VW) 
portfolios. The zero-cost spread portfolio (5-1) that longs and shorts the high- and low-OC/TA 
portfolios are reported in the last row.  
Insert Table 9 about here 
 Consistent with our earlier findings, Table 9 shows that average portfolio returns (RET) 
increase monotonically with organization capital. In Panel A, the average excess returns on the 
5-1 EW portfolio are statistically significant at the 1% level and amount to 31 basis points per 
month, or 3.7 percentage points annually. In the second column, we find a similar and 
monotonically increasing pattern in trading alpha with organization capital. The alpha for the 5-1 
portfolio is almost identical to the average excess returns (alpha=32 basis points per month), 
indicative of the failure of the global three factors in pricing the organization capital portfolios. 
In addition, high-OC/TA stocks have smaller exposure to the global market portfolio and load 
more heavily on the global size factor, in line with the US-based evidence reported by Eisfeldt 
and Papanikolaou (2013). In Panel B, we similarly document that average excess returns and 
trading alphas of the VW portfolios increase with organization capital in mostly monotonic 
manners, although being somewhat smaller in magnitude and less significant (at the 10% level).   
 To test our hypothesis that the positive OC-return association is stronger in flexible labor 
markets, we divide the countries into low (7 countries), middle (6 countries) and high (7 
countries) groups according to average EPL (see Table 6) and combine stocks with the same 
portfolio ranks across these country groups. We report the trading alpha of the zero-cost spread 
portfolios (5-1) that long and short the high- and low-OC/TA portfolios in the last row, and those 
of the spread portfolios (3-1) longing and shorting the high- and low-EPL portfolios in the 
rightmost column. As Panel A shows, consistent with our hypothesis and earlier results, the 
trading alpha on the 5-1 EW portfolio is small and insignificant for the low flexibility group, but 
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increase markedly as we move towards the high flexibility group. More importantly, the 
difference in trading alpha of the 5-1 EW portfolios between the high and low flexibility groups 
amounts to 44 basis points per month and is significant at the 5% level. In Panel B, the results 
based on the VW portfolios exhibit similar patterns in general. 
 We recognize that systematic risk may change over time and adopt two approaches to 
address this issue. First, we estimate equation (7) with a 60-month rolling window to obtain 
time-varying estimates for alphas and other factor loadings for the OC/TA-sorted and the spread 
portfolios. Following Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004), we average these time-varying 
estimates of alpha and factor loadings over time and use their time-series volatility to compute 
their standard errors (with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation). Similarly, our results 
(unreported) show that trading alpha of the EW and VW portfolios increases monotonically with 
organization capital, especially for the middle and high EPL country groups. Second, we follow 
the methodology as described in Lewellen and Nagel (2006) and estimate a conditional version 
of the global three-factor model that does not require the specification of conditioning 
information. Specifically, we estimate equation (7) yearly using monthly returns from January to 
December each year and find similar results (unreported) for both EW and VW portfolios (for 
more details, please see Table IA.18 of the Internet Appendix). 
 Overall, adjusting for the global risk factors cannot explain away the positive abnormal 
returns associated with organization capital. Our results hold even after relaxing the assumption 
of constant betas, suggesting that the positive OC-return association is unlikely to operate 
through increased loadings on the global risk factors.  
 
 Alternative Explanations 
Thus far, we interpret our findings as consistent with Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou’s (2013) 
theoretical model. That is, organization capital is embodied in key talent who has an outside 
option. When outside option improves, firms with organization capital would incur higher costs 
to retain key talent and are thus exposed to greater risks. Because such costs increase when labor 
could move across firms more easily, we argue and show that the OC risk premia are higher for 
more flexible labor markets. However, there are at least two alternative explanations. 
 First, our findings may reflect the irreversibility nature of organization capital. Capital 
investment can be generally viewed both as the exercise of a call option to expand capital stock 
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(growth option) and/or a concurrent purchase of a put option to reverse the investments in the 
future (the option to disinvest) (Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck, 1996). If investment is 
partially reversible, firms have the real option to disinvest. Negative aggregate shocks, despite 
reducing the value of assets and growth options, increase the value of the option to disinvest 
(Cooper, 2006). Therefore, compared to firms with disinvestment option, firms with no option to 
disinvest or completely irreversible investment are more sensitive to negative aggregate shocks. 
Because investment in organization capital incurs mostly irreversible expenses and has resale 
price that is much below purchase price (Pindyckd, 1991; Dewan, Shi, and Gurbaxani, 2007), 
high-OC/TA firms could be riskier during bad economic times and thus have higher expected 
returns.   
Second, our findings may also be driven by operating leverage. Investing in key talent 
usually involves many labor- and IT-related expenses that typically have a fixed or quasi-fixed 
component. A high share of fixed costs relative to variable costs reduces a firm’s ability to adjust 
unit cost to mitigate the impact of aggregate demand, thereby rendering its earnings more 
sensitive to market-wide shocks (Lev, 1974). Therefore, under this “traditional” operating 
leverage view, it is possible that the higher returns of organization capital represent 
compensation for higher market systematic risk. In a related strand of literature, Donangelo 
(2014) argues that flexibility of labor to move across industries is a special form of operating 
leverage that amplifies firms’ systematic risk exposure. Under this mechanism, mobile industries 
have less elastic wages because they rely on workers with general skills who can search for 
greater salaries across industries. Firm risks increase because of their lower wage elasticity and 
the resulting increased sensitivity of their cash flows to industry-specific shocks. Hence, our 
results of a stronger OC-return association in more mobile industries (see Table 8) are 
nonetheless consistent with higher operating leverage.   
If these alternative explanations are valid, one should expect high-OC/TA firms to be 
riskier during bad times and that the higher expected returns to organization capital can be 
explained by increased loadings on systematic risk. A natural implication from these predictions 
is that the conditional CAPM should price the cross section of OC-sorted portfolios. However, 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find no evidence in the US market that high-OC stocks are 
riskier than low-OC stocks in times of high conditional market premium. Similarly, our factor 
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model regression results show that the conditional version of the global three-factor model fails 
to price the OC-sorted portfolios, again inconsistent with these alternative explanations.  
To shed further light on this issue, we follow Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) 
and classify economy states into “good”, “normal”, and “bad” states for each country based on 
GDP growth and domestic stock market returns (at the 25th and 75th breakpoints). We compare 
univariately the estimated loadings on the global and regional market portfolios between the 
high- and low-OC/TA stocks (median breakpoint for OC/TA) within each economy state. As 
Table 10 shows, high-OC/TA firms do not exhibit greater exposure to global or regional market 
risk during bad states, regardless of whether the economy states are defined by GDP growth or 
domestic market performance. This evidence is inconsistent with the alternative explanations.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that national regulations of employment protection 
increase firms’ operating leverage by imposing large labor adjustment costs. For instance, 
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) document that stricter EPL reduces financial leverage through 
increasing firms’ fixed costs or operating leverage. Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013) find that 
the labor adjustment costs induced by stricter EPL increase firms’ cost stickiness. Therefore, if 
the positive OC-return relationship is driven by operating leverage, we should expect this 
relationship to be stronger in countries with lower EPL, i.e., more restrictive EPL. Our main 
findings, which are contrary to this prediction, are inconsistent with the operating leverage 
explanation. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Organization capital consists of the stock of know-how or knowledge that contributes to firm 
productivity (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). Unlike physical 
capital, organization capital is embodied in a firm’s key talent, who typically have an outside 
option. The shareholders of firms with organization capital are exposed to additional risks 
because their share of organization capital rent is reduced when the outside option of key talent 
improves (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013).  
In this paper, we explore the cross-country implications of organization capital 
investment and hypothesize that these investments are riskier for shareholders in countries with 
more flexible labor markets. We argue that the increased labor mobility and greater competition 
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for key talent in such markets improve key talent’s outside option and the ease with which such 
talent can leave the firms to pursue outside options. This, in turn, increases the cost of retaining 
key talent and reduces the rent that shareholders can extract from organization capital.  
Based on a sample of 16,962 firms from 20 OECD countries over the period from 1998 
to 2013, our analysis yields several important findings and implications. First, we present new 
international evidence that firms with more organization capital have significantly higher stock 
returns. Second, we find that the positive association between organization capital and stock 
returns is significantly stronger for countries in which labor regulations are less restrictive. This 
finding is consistent with the argument that the threat of losing key talent and the mobility of key 
talent are both higher in flexible labor markets, rendering investment in organization capital 
riskier for shareholders. Therefore, one should consider these labor-related institutional features 
when investing overseas or managing their portfolio risk.  
Finally, we verify the validity of capitalized SG&A expenses as a proxy for organization 
capital for 19 non-US OECD countries and show that it captures firm productivity, innovative 
efficiency, and managerial quality well. This finding advances the growing literature on 
organization capital and offers some guidance on future international research on intangible 
capital. Our results are robust to alternative samples, estimation methods, adjustments and 
assumptions in estimating organization capital, and alternative measures of labor market 
flexibility and cost of capital. Our findings provide useful guidance to corporate managers who 
allocate corporate resources relating to human capital, IT, and technology.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Country 
Our sample covers firms in 20 OECD countries over the period from 1998 to 2013. For US firms, we only include those traded in the AMEX, NYSE, 
and NASDAQ, and download their financial and security data from Compustat and CRSP. All non-US data are downloaded from Compustat Global and 
converted into US dollars using daily closing exchange rates from the Bank of England or Thomson Reuters. All financial stocks are excluded. We 
measure labor market flexibility using the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index from OECD. EPL is the negative of the average of its three 
subindexes, EPR, EPC, and EPT. A higher EPL indicates greater labor market flexibility. This table reports the average EPL, its subindexes, ratio of 
organization capital to total assets (OC/TA), and buy-and-hold annual returns (RET) for each country. The number of firm-year observations is also 
reported. The detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix A1. 
  
  
  
Components of EPL 
 Country Obs. % OC/TA EPL EPR EPC EPT RET 
Australia 9,978 7.6% 0.639 -1.724 -1.423 -2.880 -0.880 17.8% 
Austria 576 0.4% 0.503 -2.346 -2.475 -3.250 -1.310 17.8% 
Belgium 868 0.7% 0.414 -3.137 -1.914 -5.127 -2.378 12.4% 
Canada 1,923 1.5% 0.837 -1.380 -0.920 -2.970 -0.250 18.0% 
Denmark 1,095 0.8% 1.036 -2.252 -2.139 -3.239 -1.379 15.2% 
Finland 1,336 1.0% 0.446 -1.847 -2.199 -1.788 -1.560 15.8% 
France 5,916 4.5% 0.543 -3.136 -2.406 -3.380 -3.629 13.9% 
Germany 6,688 5.1% 0.689 -2.541 -2.679 -3.630 -1.329 13.8% 
Ireland 344 0.3% 0.816 -1.650 -1.367 -3.105 -0.481 17.9% 
Italy 2,310 1.8% 0.230 -3.063 -2.759 -4.129 -2.311 8.4% 
Japan 34,094 25.9% 1.305 -1.901 -1.551 -3.250 -0.912 11.0% 
Netherlands 1,354 1.0% 0.642 -2.276 -2.862 -3.000 -0.978 11.7% 
New Zealand 742 0.6% 0.234 -0.792 -1.496 -0.008 -0.880 20.3% 
Norway 1,267 1.0% 0.319 -2.588 -2.327 -2.501 -2.936 21.1% 
Portugal 453 0.3% 0.236 -3.101 -4.372 -2.516 -2.426 10.9% 
Spain 997 0.8% 0.296 -3.050 -2.335 -3.750 -3.061 9.7% 
Sweden 3,211 2.4% 1.041 -2.095 -2.618 -2.500 -1.173 16.7% 
Switzerland 2,038 1.5% 0.738 -2.119 -1.598 -3.629 -1.129 16.6% 
United Kingdom 11,425 8.7% 1.376 -1.482 -1.241 -2.880 -0.340 14.3% 
United States 45,195 34.3% 1.229 -1.130 -0.260 -2.880 -0.250 19.3% 
Total 131,810               
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
This table reports summary statistics and the results of univariate analysis. Firm-year observations are divided into two groups based on the sample median of 
OC/TA. We use t-test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to determine whether the difference in means (medians) is statistically significant. The detailed variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix A1. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
      
High OC/TA 
(N=65,849) 
 
Low 
OC/TA(N=65,850) 
 
Difference 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean  Median  
RET 131,810 15.47% 5.21% 62.91% 
 
16.97% 5.50% 
 
13.98% 4.90% 
 
2.99% *** 0.60% *** 
OC/TA 131,810 1.073 0.750 1.175 
 
1.874 1.476 
 
0.272 0.231 
 
1.602 *** 1.245 *** 
ln(BM) 131,810 -0.407 -0.356 0.869 
 
-0.439 -0.375 
 
-0.375 -0.337 
 
-0.064 *** -0.038 *** 
Profitability 131,810 -0.009 0.027 0.171 
 
-0.016 0.027 
 
-0.002 0.027 
 
-0.014 *** -0.001 
 R&D/Sale 131,810 0.092 0.000 0.433 
 
0.086 0.006 
 
0.098 0.000 
 
-0.012 *** 0.006 *** 
Leverage 131,810 0.197 0.169 0.176 
 
0.170 0.135 
 
0.224 0.209 
 
-0.053 *** -0.074 *** 
CAPX/TA 131,810 0.052 0.033 0.061 
 
0.040 0.028 
 
0.064 0.040 
 
-0.024 *** -0.012 *** 
Asset tangibility 131,810 0.282 0.229 0.228 
 
0.225 0.195 
 
0.339 0.287 
 
-0.114 *** -0.092 *** 
Foreign indicator 131,810 0.396 0.000 0.489 
 
0.389 0.000 
 
0.404 0.000 
 
-0.015 *** 0.000 *** 
Deflated total assets (2005 $US) 131,810 2,260 283 6,536 
 
1,439 210 
 
3,080 406 
 
-1,641 *** -196 *** 
ME ($ millions) 131,810 1,802 189 5,462 
 
1,401 140 
 
2,204 258 
 
-804 *** -118 *** 
ln(ME) 131,810 5.394 5.242 2.059 
 
5.111 4.945 
 
5.677 5.553 
 
-0.566 *** -0.608 *** 
Sale/TA 131,672 1.049 0.926 0.709 
 
1.251 1.095 
 
0.847 0.723 
 
0.405 *** 0.372 *** 
ȕWMKT 131,810 0.964 0.878 0.824 
 
0.916 0.833 
 
1.012 0.921 
 
-0.096 *** -0.088 *** 
ȕWSMB 131,810 1.047 0.835 1.665 
 
1.109 0.905 
 
0.984 0.771 
 
0.125 *** 0.134 *** 
ȕWHML 131,810 0.049 0.109 1.869 
 
0.039 0.095 
 
0.059 0.123 
 
-0.020 * -0.028 * 
ȕRMKT 131,810 0.969 0.913 1.454 
 
0.959 0.897 
 
0.978 0.930 
 
-0.019 ** -0.033 *** 
ȕRSMB 131,810 0.811 0.708 1.589 
 
0.861 0.771 
 
0.761 0.642 
 
0.100 *** 0.129 *** 
ȕRHML 131,810 0.092 0.129 1.872 
 
0.064 0.118 
 
0.120 0.139 
 
-0.056 *** -0.020 *** 
Rule of law 131,810 9.472 10.000 0.589 
 
9.439 9.233 
 
9.505 10.000 
 
-0.066 *** -0.767 *** 
Anti-director rights index 131,810 3.729 3.500 0.774 
 
3.820 4.000 
 
3.638 3.500 
 
0.182 *** 0.500 *** 
Individualism 131,810 74.073 89.000 18.979 
 
72.200 89.000 
 
75.945 80.000 
 
-3.745 *** 9.000 *** 
Stock Cap to GDP 131,810 101.270 102.580 38.984 
 
102.042 103.600 
 
100.497 102.230 
 
1.545 *** 1.370 *** 
Financial Development 131,810 159.631 175.570 38.247 
 
170.232 178.430 
 
149.030 161.690 
 
21.202 *** 16.740 *** 
Ln(GDP per capita) 131,810 10.559 10.525 0.140 
 
10.570 10.556 
 
10.547 10.521 
 
0.023 *** 0.035 *** 
GDP growth 131,810 0.012 0.017 0.021 
 
0.011 0.016 
 
0.013 0.017 
 
-0.002 *** 0.000 *** 
CPI growth 131,810 0.016 0.018 0.015   0.014 0.016   0.018 0.020  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 
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TABLE 3 
Validating OC/TA: Evidence from 19 Non-US Countries 
This table reports the results of our validation tests for OC/TA using the non-US sample. Columns (1) reports the 
results of regressions examining whether OC/TA captures a firm’s productive efficiency, as measured by the ratio 
of sales to total assets, using all firm-year observations and controlling for firm size. Columns (2) to (5) examine 
whether OC/TA captures higher innovative efficiency using all country-year observations. We use four country-
level measures of innovative efficiency. TPF is the number of triadic patent families owned by a country in a 
given year from the OECD; Patent is the number of patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) for our sample countries in a given year; R&D is the gross domestic expenditure in R&D for our 
sample countries in a given year from the OECD; Patent/R&D is Patent divided by R&D. For these four 
regressions, the variable of interest is the country-average OC/TA. We control for year fixed effects and eight 
lagged country characteristics, including the rule of law index (Rule of law), anti-director rights index (anti-
director rights index), individualism index (individualism), stock market capitalization to GDP (Stock Cap to 
GDP), total private credit to GDP (Financial development), log GDP per capita (Ln(GDP per capita)), rate of 
change in GDP per capita (Growth in GDP per capita), and rate of change in CPI (Growth in CPI). In column 
(6), we examine whether OC/TA captures managerial quality by regressing the country-level managerial practices 
scores from Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) on average OC/TA. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level for column (1) and at the country level for columns (3) to (6). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Firm-Year Panel 
 
Country-Year Panel 
 
Country 
Cross 
Section 
 
Sale/TA 
 
Ln(TPF) Ln(Patent) Ln(R&D) Ln(Patent/R&D) 
 
Managerial 
Practices 
Scores 
  (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
OC/TA 0.137*** 
 
2.303*** 2.589*** 1.857*** 0.062** 
 
0.179* 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.739) (0.772) (0.626) (0.028) 
 
(0.085) 
Ln(ME) -0.008***      
 (0.003)               
Country controls 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Industry FE Yes 
       Country FE Yes 
       Year FE Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Sample 1999-2013 
 
1999-2011 2001-2013 2000-2012 2001-2012 
  Obs. 86,510 
 
245 241 233 218 
 
11 
Adj. R2 0.328   0.485 0.522 0.430 0.547   0.304 
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TABLE 4 
Organization Capital and Stock Returns 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between organization capital and 
stock returns. The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold annual stock returns (RET). The main 
independent variable is the stock of organization capital (OC/TA), constructed using the 
perpetual inventory method following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Other firm-level 
independent variables include: Log book-to-market equity ratio (Ln(BM)), log market 
capitalization (Ln(ME)), return on total assets (ROA), R&D to total sales (R&D/Sale), total debt 
to total assets (Leverage), capital investments to total assets (CAPX/TA), property, plant and 
equipment to total assets (Asset tangibility), and foreign operations indicator (Foreign currency 
indicator). We control for a firm’s factor loadings to the global and regional market, size, and 
value factors estimated using weekly return data within a fiscal year. Country-level control 
variables added in columns 3 and 4 include: stock market capitalization to GDP (Stock Cap to 
GDP), total private credit to GDP (Financial development), log GDP per capita (Ln(GDP per 
capita)), rate of change in GDP per capita (GDP growth), and rate of change in CPI (CPI 
growth). All independent variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. 
Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification. Robust 
standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
RET 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OC/TA 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(BM) 
 
0.080*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(ME) 
 
-0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability 
 
0.144*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
R&D/Sale 
 
0.007 0.006 0.006 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 
 
0.075*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CAPX/TA 
 
-0.001 -0.011 -0.013 
  
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Asset tangibility 
 
-0.023* -0.018 -0.024** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Foreign currency indicator 
 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ȕWMKT 
  
0.025*** 0.031*** 
 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
ȕWSMB 
  
-0.005*** -0.007*** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕWHML 
  
-0.002* -0.002* 
 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRMKT 
  
0.001 0.001 
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(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRSMB 
  
0.001 0.001 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRHML 
  
0.002** 0.003** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Stock Cap to GDP 
   
0.000 
    
(0.000) 
Financial Development 
   
-0.002*** 
    
(0.000) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
   
-0.924*** 
    
(0.109) 
GDP growth 
   
-1.686*** 
    
(0.195) 
CPI growth 
   
2.287*** 
        (0.289) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 131,810 131,810 131,810 131,810 
Adj. R2 0.155 0.172 0.173 0.177 
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TABLE 5 
Organization capital, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between organization capital, 
labor market flexibility, and stock returns. The dependent variable is the annual buy-and-hold 
stock returns (RET). The main independent variables are the stock of organization capital 
(OC/TA), constructed using the perpetual inventory method following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013), and the Employment Protection Legislation index (EPL). The lagged firm- and country-
level control variables are the same as those used in Table 5 and are defined in Appendix A.1. 
The rule of law index, anti-director rights index, and individualism index are also included in the 
regressions. Column (3) also includes the interaction between all country control variables and 
OC/TA. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification. 
Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
RET 
 (1) (2) (3) 
OC/TA 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.480** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.243) 
OC/TA×EPL 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
OC/TA×Rule of law 
  
0.000 
   
(0.007) 
OC/TA×Anti-director rights index 
  
-0.001 
   
(0.005) 
OC/TA×Individualism 
  
0.000** 
   
(0.000) 
OC/TA×Stock Cap to GDP 
  
-0.001*** 
   
(0.000) 
OC/TA×Financial Development 
  
-0.000*** 
   
(0.000) 
OC/TA×Ln(GDP per capita) 
  
-0.026 
   
(0.023) 
OC/TA×GDP growth 
  
0.069 
   
(0.082) 
OC/TA×CPI growth 
  
-0.234 
   
(0.192) 
Ln(BM) 
 
0.081*** 0.081*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(ME) 
 
-0.021*** -0.021*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability 
 
0.150*** 0.157*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) 
R&D/Sale 
 
0.007 0.006 
  
(0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 
 
0.071*** 0.076*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
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CAPX/TA 
 
-0.010 -0.012 
  
(0.042) (0.042) 
Asset tangibility 
 
-0.020 -0.024* 
  
(0.012) (0.012) 
Foreign currency indicator 
 
0.020*** 0.021*** 
  
(0.003) (0.004) 
ȕWMKT 
 
0.027*** 0.031*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
ȕWSMB 
 
-0.005*** -0.007*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕWHML 
 
-0.002** -0.003** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRMKT 
 
0.000 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRSMB 
 
0.000 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRHML 
 
0.002** 0.003** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
EPL 0.317*** 0.323*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
Stock Cap to GDP 
  
0.000*** 
   
(0.000) 
Financial Development 
  
-0.002*** 
   
(0.000) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
  
-0.818*** 
   
(0.116) 
GDP growth 
  
-1.971*** 
   
(0.219) 
CPI growth 
  
2.646*** 
      (0.334) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 131,810 131,810 131,810 
Adj. R2 0.157 0.174 0.179 
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TABLE 6 
Country-by-Country Analysis 
This table reports the results of the country-by-country analysis of the association between organization capital and stock returns. To increase the 
statistical power, we rank the countries from low to high according to average EPL (see Table 1) and divide consecutively every four countries 
into a group. We estimate our baseline regressions separately for each country and 4-Country group. To make the coefficients more comparable 
across countries and groups, we standardize the OC/TA variable within each country and country group. The number of observations, adjusted R2, 
and estimated coefficients and firm-clustered standard errors for OC/TA are reported. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 
49 industry classification. All firm controls follow the baseline models. Industry and year dummies are included in the country regressions, and 
industry, country, and year dummies, and the country control variables are included in the country group regressions. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Country-by-Country 
  
4-Country Group 
 
OC/TA 
    
OC/TA 
  Countries EPL Std. Coef. S.E. Obs. Adj. R2   Group Std. Coef. S.E. Obs. Adj. R2 
Belgium -3.137 0.022 (0.022) 868 0.295 
 
1 0.011* (0.006) 9,547 0.285 France -3.136 0.008 (0.007) 5,916 0.271  Portugal -3.101 0.025 (0.030) 453 0.464 
 Italy -3.063 0.029** (0.013) 2,310 0.349 
 Spain -3.050 0.050** (0.022) 997 0.460 
 
2 0.019*** (0.007) 9,528 0.29 Norway -2.588 0.019 (0.023) 1,267 0.344  Germany -2.541 0.022** (0.009) 6,688 0.285 
 Austria -2.346 -0.011 (0.028) 576 0.345 
 Netherlands -2.276 0.020 (0.015) 1,354 0.400 
 
3 0.028*** (0.007) 7,698 0.284 Denmark -2.252 0.015 (0.017) 1,095 0.253  Switzerland -2.119 0.007 (0.014) 2,038 0.291 
 Sweden -2.095 0.035*** (0.013) 3,211 0.313 
 Japan -1.901 0.026*** (0.004) 34,094 0.343 
 
4 0.030*** (0.004) 45,752 0.211 Finland -1.847 0.053** (0.025) 1,336 0.401  Australia -1.724 0.034*** (0.011) 9,978 0.161 
 Ireland -1.650 0.024 (0.042) 344 0.300 
 United Kingdom -1.482 0.043*** (0.008) 11,425 0.215 
 
5 0.036*** (0.004) 59,285 0.175 Canada -1.380 0.025 (0.024) 1,923 0.179  United States -1.130 0.035*** (0.004) 45,195 0.173 
 New Zealand -0.792 0.033 (0.024) 742 0.173 
 
       
5-1 0.025*** 
 
                p-value [0.0003]       
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TABLE 7 
Robustness Tests 
This table presents results of our robustness tests. Columns 1 to 5 show results using alternative specifications and assumptions in the estimation of organization capital. In column 
(1), we annually industry-adjust OC/TA by subtracting a firm's OC/TA from its country-specific industry mean and then dividing it by the cross-sectional standard deviation. In 
columns (2) and (3), OC is estimated with depreciation rates of 30% and 50%, respectively. In column (4), the first 5 years of OC/TA observations are excluded when capitalizing 
SG&A expenses. Column (5) measures the (flow) investment in OC using the ratio of SG&A expenses to total assets. Columns (6) to (10) test the robustness of our results to the 
use of alternative samples. Column (6) excludes small stocks with market capitalization within the lowest quartile. Column (7) excludes firms from the US and Japan, which have 
the most firm-year observations. Column (8) excludes the crisis years, including 2007, 2008, and 2009. Column (9) uses a subsample ending in 2006 whereas column (10) uses a 
subsample after 2009. Column (11) use an alternative labor market flexibility measure (Flex index) from the World Bank Group. Column (12) uses an alternative measure of 
expected returns: implied cost of capital (ICC AVG). For brevity, we only report the estimates for OC/TA, the labor market flexibility indexes, and their interacted terms. The firm-
level controls (including the factor loadings) follow the baseline model specification. We also control for the interacted terms between the country controls variables and OC/TA in 
each regression. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The unabridged version of all these results can be found in the Internet Appendix. 
 
RET 
 
ICC AVG 
 
Industry-
adjusted Depreciation rates 
Exclude 
first 5 
years 
SG&A/TA 
 
>ME25% 
Non-(US 
& JP) 
Exclude 
crisis <=2006 >2009 Flex index  ICC AVG 
 
  30% 50%                       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)   (12) 
OC/TA 0.910*** 0.854** 1.230** 0.501** 2.335** 
 
-0.155 -0.097 0.833*** 2.693*** 0.065 -0.912*** 
 
0.112 
 
(0.309) (0.386) (0.574) (0.247) (1.031) 
 
(0.253) (0.301) (0.257) (0.563) (0.381) (0.310) 
 
(0.098) 
OC/TA×EPL 0.050*** 0.086*** 0.131*** 0.045*** 0.223*** 
 
0.015** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.118*** 0.017* 
  
0.006** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.007) (0.034) 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) 
  
(0.003) 
EPL 0.217*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.039 0.155*** 
 
0.201*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.282*** -0.263 
  
0.043*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.047) (0.169) 
  
(0.010) 
OC/TA×Flex index 
           
0.073*** 
  
            
(0.020) 
  Flex index 
           
-0.242*** 
                          (0.044)     
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
OC/TA×Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs. 131,810 131,810 131,810 109,263 131,810 
 
98,857 52,521 103,420 66,178 37,242 84,113 
 
95,820 
Adj. R2 0.177 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.178   0.190 0.176 0.141 0.182 0.083 0.162   0.315 
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TABLE 8 
Further Evidence: Industry Labor Market Flexibility 
This table reports the results of regressions that use an alternative measure of labor market 
flexibility at the industry level. The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold annual stock returns 
(RET). The main independent variable is the stock of organization capital (OC/TA), constructed 
using the perpetual inventory method following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). We obtain the 
industry labor mobility data for the US from Donangelo (2014). In columns (1) and (2) (columns 
(3) and (4)), we divide the US industries into high and low groups according to the sample 
median (the breakpoint at the 70th percentile) of labor mobility. We apply these classifications of 
mobile industries to the rest of the sample countries. High mobility (FF49) is an indicator that 
equals one if a firm belongs to a mobile industry under the Fama-French 49 industry 
classification, and zero otherwise. High mobility (SIC2) is an indicator that equals one if a firm 
belongs to a mobile industry under the 2-digit SIC industry classification, and zero otherwise. 
The lagged firm- and country-level control variables are the same as those used in Table 5 and 
are defined in Appendix A1. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49 
industry classification. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
RET 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
OC/TA 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
0.021*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
OC/TA×High mobility (FF49) (Median) 0.018*** 
    
 
(0.004) 
    OC/TA×High mobility (SIC2) (Median) 
 
0.013*** 
   
  
(0.004) 
   OC/TA×High mobility (FF49) (Top 30%) 
  
0.016*** 
 
    
(0.004) 
 OC/TA×High mobility (SIC2) (Top 30%) 
    
0.014*** 
     
(0.004) 
Ln(BM) 0.081*** 0.080*** 
 
0.081*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(ME) -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability 0.154*** 0.151*** 
 
0.152*** 0.152*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
R&D/Sale 0.007 0.006 
 
0.005 0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 
0.074*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
CAPX/TA -0.009 -0.016 
 
-0.012 -0.011 
 
(0.042) (0.042) 
 
(0.042) (0.042) 
Asset tangibility -0.028** -0.023* 
 
-0.027** -0.027** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
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Foreign indicator 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
ȕWMKT 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 
0.031*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
ȕWSMB -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕWHML -0.002* -0.002* 
 
-0.002* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRMKT 0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRSMB 0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
ȕRHML 0.003** 0.003** 
 
0.003** 0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Stock Cap to GDP 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Development -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.925*** -0.921*** 
 
-0.922*** -0.924*** 
 
(0.109) (0.109) 
 
(0.109) (0.109) 
GDP growth -1.688*** -1.687*** 
 
-1.688*** -1.687*** 
 
(0.195) (0.195) 
 
(0.195) (0.195) 
CPI growth 2.290*** 2.284*** 
 
2.285*** 2.280*** 
  (0.288) (0.288)   (0.288) (0.288) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Obs. 131,810 131,810 
 
131,810 131,810 
Adj. R2 0.177 0.177   0.177 0.177 
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TABLE 9 
Factor Model Regressions 
This table reports the results of our factor model regressions estimated using monthly returns data. We use fiscal year t-1 accounting 
data to explain stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. In the end of June each year, we sort stocks into quintiles based on 
its year t-1 OC/TA within each country-industry pair. We combine the stocks with the same portfolio rank to form five equally (Panel 
A) and value weighted (Panel B) portfolios across all countries and within country groups (based on labor market flexibility, i.e., 
average EPL) and calculate the average portfolio monthly returns. We risk-adjust these portfolio returns by regressing them on the 
global market (rW-rf), size (WSMB), and value (WHML) factors. For the all-country sample, we report the returns, estimated alphas, 
betas, adjusted R-squared, and number of observation for each portfolio. For each of the country groups sorted by average EPL, we 
only report the estimated alphas for these portfolios. The low group includes 7 countries with the lowest average EPL: Belgium, France, 
Portugal, Italy, Spain, Norway, and Germany. The high group includes 7 countries with the highest average EPL: Finland, Australia, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand. The remaining 6 countries are in the middle group: Austria, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan. We report the portfolio returns and alphas of the high minus low zero spread 
portfolio (5-1) and the high minus low EPL spread portfolio (3-1). The Newey-West robust standard errors with 3 month lags are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equally weighted portfolios 
         
EPL  
 
All countries 
 
1 Low 2 3 High 3-1 
OC/TA RET α (rW-rf) WSMB WHML Adj. R2 Obs.   α 
1 Low 0.0078 -0.0001 1.009*** 0.773*** 0.167** 0.936 174 
 
0.0006 -0.0028 0.0014 0.0008 
 
(0.0049) (0.0011) (0.025) (0.116) (0.067) 
   
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
2 0.0089* 0.0006 1.009*** 0.802*** 0.240*** 0.931 174 
 
-0.0067 -0.0017 0.0022 0.0090* 
 
(0.0049) (0.0012) (0.024) (0.126) (0.074) 
   
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0049) 
3 0.0093** 0.0013 0.965*** 0.682*** 0.257*** 0.941 174 
 
0.0004 -0.0004 0.0032** 0.0042* 
 
(0.0047) (0.0010) (0.021) (0.087) (0.061) 
   
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
4 0.0109** 0.0029*** 0.963*** 0.811*** 0.197*** 0.939 174 
 
0.0005 0.0000 0.0049*** 0.0044** 
 
(0.0048) (0.0010) (0.021) (0.105) (0.068) 
   
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
5 High 0.0109** 0.0031*** 0.940*** 0.836*** 0.168** 0.918 174 
 
0.0003 -0.0002 0.0055*** 0.0052** 
 
(0.0049) (0.0010) (0.024) (0.109) (0.071) 
   
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0023) 
5-1 0.0031*** 0.0032*** -0.069*** 0.064 0.0012 0.100 174 
 
-0.0004 0.0027*** 0.0041*** 0.0044** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.015) (0.040) (0.028)       (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0022) 
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Panel B: Value weighted portfolios 
         
EPL 
 
All countries 
 
1 Low 2 3 High 3-1 
OC/TA RET α (rW-rf) WSMB WHML Adj. R2 Obs.   α 
1 Low 0.0041 0.0008 1.044*** -0.084 -0.156*** 0.948 174 
 
0.0017 -0.0025 0.0010 -0.0007 
 
(0.0045) (0.0012) (0.023) (0.070) (0.054) 
   
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0026) 
2 0.0051 0.0007 1.129*** -0.201* -0.236** 0.887 174 
 
-0.0061** -0.0032 0.0020 0.0081** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0016) (0.034) (0.121) (0.093) 
   
(0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0039) 
3 0.0053 0.0007 0.998*** -0.133** -0.133** 0.933 174 
 
0.0023 -0.0007 0.0014 -0.0010 
 
(0.0041) (0.0011) (0.024) (0.066) (0.065) 
   
(0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0039) 
4 0.0069* 0.0021** 0.924*** -0.129** -0.041 0.941 174 
 
-0.0015 0.0018 0.0030*** 0.0045 
 
(0.0038) (0.0009) (0.017) (0.053) (0.052) 
   
(0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0033) 
5 High 0.0070* 0.0036** 0.936*** -0.243*** -0.163** 0.887 174 
 
0.0024 0.0005 0.0050*** 0.0026 
 
(0.0040) (0.0014) (0.035) (0.087) (0.082) 
   
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0027) 
5-1 0.0029* 0.0028* -0.108*** -0.159* -0.007 0.097 174 
 
0.0007 0.0030 0.0040** 0.0033* 
  (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.041) (0.090) (0.065)       (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0020) 
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TABLE 10 
Alternative Explanation: Investment Irreversibility and Operating Leverage 
This table examines the relation between organization capital and the firms’ exposure to the global and regional market risk in 
different market conditions. In Panels A and B, based on the firm-year panel dataset, we divide the firms into high and low groups 
according to the sample median OC/TA. We also classify our sample into three states according to the local market conditions. Panel 
A measures local market conditions by the real GDP annual growth rates; Panel B measures local market conditions by the value-
weighted country stock market returns. Within each country, a bad (good) state is defined to be the 25% worst (best) performing years. 
The remaining years are defined as normal. We report the means and medians of the firms’ global and regional market beta (ȕWMKT and 
ȕRMKT) for the two OC groups in each of the three states. We also report the mean and median differences between the high- and low-
OC groups, and the statistical significance based on two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: GDP growth 
  
High OC/TA 
 
Low OC/TA 
 
High Minus Low 
 State Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
ȕWMKT 
Bad 25% 0.915 0.810 
 
1.117 0.997 
 
-0.201 *** -0.187 *** 
Normal 50% 0.973 0.903 
 
1.004 0.935 
 
-0.031 *** -0.032 *** 
Good 25% 0.802 0.690 
 
0.938 0.822 
 
-0.136 *** -0.132 *** 
            
ȕRMKT 
Bad 25% 1.007 0.945 
 
1.006 0.945 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 Normal 50% 0.928 0.901 
 
0.970 0.939 
 
-0.042 *** -0.038 *** 
Good 25% 0.981 0.856 
 
0.973 0.898 
 
0.008 
 
-0.042 ** 
 
Panel B: Country stock market returns 
  
High OC/TA 
 
Low OC/TA 
 
High Minus Low 
 State  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
ȕWMKT 
Bad 25% 0.880 0.825 
 
1.026 0.954 
 
-0.146 *** -0.129 *** 
Normal 50% 0.913 0.816 
 
1.015 0.916 
 
-0.103 *** -0.100 *** 
Good 25% 0.963 0.878 
 
0.990 0.902 
 
-0.026 *** -0.024 *** 
            
ȕRMKT 
Bad 25% 0.952 0.891 
 
0.965 0.946 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.055 *** 
Normal 50% 0.980 0.909 
 
0.967 0.917 
 
0.013 
 
-0.008 
 Good 25% 0.917 0.880 
 
1.016 0.936 
 
-0.099 *** -0.056 *** 
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APPENDIX A.1 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
RET Buy-and-hold annual returns of a stock over a fiscal year. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
CRSP 
SG&A Selling, general and administrative expenses. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
OC Stock of organization capital, computed as the capitalized SG&A expenses using the 
perpetual inventory method. A firm’s stock of organization capital (OC) is 
computed by recursively cumulating its deflated value of SG&A expenses as 
follows: 
 
OCi,t = (1 - įo) · Oi,t-1 + (SG&Ait / cpit)   
 
where δo is the depreciation rate and cpit is the US consumer price index. For each 
firm, we start the recursive estimation of its stock of organizational capital since its 
first observation in the Compustat Global or North America Annual databases. For 
non-US firms, all SG&A expenses are translated into US dollars before deflating. 
Following prior studies, we treat missing observations of the SG&A expenses as 
zero. The initial stock of organization capital is defined as: 
 
OC0 = SG&A1 / (g + įo)     
 
Following prior studies (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; Li, Qiu, and Shen, 2017), 
a depreciation rate of 15% is used throughout the study. The growth rate g is 
assumed to be 10%. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
OC/TA The ratio of the stock of organization capital (OC) to total assets. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Industry-adjusted The industry-adjusted OC/TA, computed by subtracting a firm's OC/TA from its 
country-specific industry mean, and dividing the demeaned value by its standard 
Compustat Global 
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OC/TA deviations (across industry firms). Compustat North America 
OC30%/TA OC/TA in which OC is estimated with an assumed 30% depreciation rate. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
OC50%/TA OC/TA in which OC is estimated with an assumed 50% depreciation rate. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
OCEx5yr/TA OC/TA, of which the first five years of OC/TA observations are excluded when 
capitalizing the SG&A expenses. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
SG&A/TA Selling, general and administrative expenditure (SG&A) to total assets. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
   
Labor market flexibility  
EPL The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index measures the country-level 
degree of labor market flexibility. It is computed by taking the average of three 
indexes, which measure the country-level strictness of employment protection in 
individual dismissals (regular contracts) (EPR), collective dismissals (additional 
provisions) (EPC) and temporary employment (EPT), respectively. A higher value 
indicates less strict protection, or higher labor market flexibility. 
OECD 
EPR A labor market flexibility index measuring regulations relating to individual 
dismissals. 
OECD 
EPC A labor market flexibility index measuring regulations relating to collective 
dismissals. 
OECD 
EPT A labor market flexibility index measuring regulations relating to fixed-term and 
temporary work contract. 
OECD 
Flex index An overall labor market flexibility index. It is computed by taking the average of the 
Difficulty-in-hiring, Rigidity in labor hours and Difficulty-in-firing indexes. A 
higher value reflects higher flexibility.  
World Bank Group 
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Difficulty-of-hiring is an index measuring the flexibility in national labor regulation 
in relation to contracting during the hiring process. 
Rigidity-in-labor-hour is an index measuring the flexibility in national labor 
regulations in relation to labor hours. 
 Difficulty-of-firing is an index measuring the flexibility in national labor regulation 
in relation to the provisions or restrictions in redundancy. 
World Bank Group 
   
Country variables   
Rule of Law An index that measures the degree of tradition in law and order. Smaller values 
reflect less traditions in law and order. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) 
Anti-director index First developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and 
subsequently revised by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), 
the anti-director rights index measures legal protection on minority shareholders 
against management. The index ranges from 0 to 6 with a higher value reflecting 
stronger investor protection.  
 
The index is constructed by summing six indicator variables:  
(1) proxy by mail allowed; 
(2) shares not blocked before shareholder meeting;  
(3) cumulative voting/ proportional representation; 
(4) oppressed minority protection;  
(5) preemptive rights to new share issues;  
(6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting.  
 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008) 
Individualism An index of country-level degree of individualism. The index was constructed using 
evidence from psychological surveys on IBM employees between 1967 and 1973. 
The index is constructed from a factor analysis on the country mean scores on 14 
Professor Hofstede’s 
homepage 
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questions about the respondents' attitudes toward their work and private life. A 
higher index value reflects higher degree of individualism. 
Stock Cap to GDP The ratio of stock market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). World Bank 
Financial Development The ratio of total private credit to GDP. World Bank 
Ln(GDP per capita) Natural log of GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars). World Bank 
Growth in GDP per 
capita 
Percentage growth in GDP per capita. World Bank 
Growth in CPI Percentage growth in CPI. OECD 
Ln(TPF) Natural log of the number of triadic patent families (TPF) of a country in a given 
year (in thousands). 
OECD 
Ln(Patent) Natural log of the number of patents originated from a non-US country and granted 
by the USPTO in a given year (in number).  
USPTO 
Ln(R&D) Natural log of the total gross domestic expenditure on R&D by a country in a given 
year (in constant 2005 million US dollars). 
OECD 
Ln(Patent/R&D) Natural log of the ratio of Patent to R&D. USPTO, OECD 
Managerial Practices 
Scores 
A country indicator of managerial quality based on survey evidence by Bloom, 
Genakos, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012). The survey procedure follows Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2007). A higher score indicates better managerial quality.  
Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, 
and Van Reenen (2012) 
   
   
Firm controls   
Ln(BM) Log book-to-market equity ratio, computed as the book value of equity capital to 
market value at the fiscal year end. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Ln(ME) Log of market capitalization at the fiscal year end. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
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Profitability Profitability is measured by return on assets, computed as the income before 
extraordinary items to total book value of assets. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
R&D/Sale Research and Development (R&D) intensity, computed as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total net sales. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Leverage Leverage, computed as ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debts to total 
book value of assets. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
CAPX/TA Capital investment, computed as the ratio of capital expenditure to total book value 
of assets. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Asset tangibility Net property, plant & equipment to total book value of assets, as a measure of asset 
tangibility. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Foreign currency 
indicator 
A foreign currency indicator, defined as one when firms report a non-zero foreign 
currency adjustment, and zero otherwise. 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
Sale/TA Ratio of total sales to total assets. Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
ICC_AVG Composite implied cost of capital (ICC). It is the average of ICC_OJ, ICC_MPEG 
and ICC_GG. ICC_OJ is the ICC following the model of Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005). ICC_MPEG is the ICC following the model of Easton (2004. 
ICC_GG is the ICC following the model of Gordon and Gordon (1997). Following 
Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012), to increase coverage, we require a firm to have at 
least one non-missing individual ICC to compute this average ICC. 
Authors’ calculations 
Compustat Global 
Compustat North America 
High mobility (FF49) An indicator equal one if a firm belongs to a mobile industry under the Fama-French 
49 industry classification, and zero otherwise. Labor mobility is defined as the 
average inter-industry occupational dispersion of employed workers in an industry 
collected from Donangelo (2011). We divide the Fama-French 49 industries into 
high and low groups according to the sample median or the 70th percentile of labor 
mobility. We apply this classification of mobile industries to the rest of the sample 
countries. 
Professor Donangelo’s 
homepage 
High mobility (SIC2) An indicator equal one if a firm belongs to a mobile industry under the 2-digit Professor Donangelo’s 
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industry classification, and zero otherwise. Labor mobility is defined as the average 
inter-industry occupational dispersion of employed workers in an industry collected 
from Donangelo (2011). We divide the 2-digit SIC industries into high and low 
groups according to the sample median or the 70th percentile of labor mobility. We 
apply this classification of mobile industries to the rest of the sample countries. 
homepage 
 
